Know what is running.
Record the agent, its owner, purpose and connected resources. Distinguish its own identity from actions performed on behalf of a person.
An agent needs an owner, an identity and a limit to its authority. Control what it can reach, what it can change and how its access is removed.
Explore the capabilityTreat model output and retrieved content as untrusted input. The systems executing actions must enforce the permission boundary, regardless of how convincing a request sounds.
Record the agent, its owner, purpose and connected resources. Distinguish its own identity from actions performed on behalf of a person.
Apply least privilege, short-lived credentials, network controls and sandboxing where appropriate. Separate reading, drafting and committing changes.
Exercise prompt-injection and misuse scenarios. Log relevant actions, protect the logs and provide a tested way to stop work and revoke access.
An agent can retrieve approved information and draft a change, but cannot publish it without a separate approval.
Guardrails can fail. Use layered controls and test them at the system boundary rather than relying on a prompt to enforce security.
Not a sufficient one. The system must independently enforce authentication, authorisation and permitted operations.
By never relying on the model to police itself. Each agent gets its own identity and the narrowest permissions that work, consequential actions wait for a person, and every action is logged. Then we attack it ourselves, with prompt injection and misuse scenarios, before it goes live.
Technical reference: Microsoft: agent identities (opens in a new tab)